



Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris

European Security at stake

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**The European Convention revisited by security and defence
professionals**

June 2003

Disclaimer: The content and views presented in this report engage only its authors and represent their personal perception of the interviews.

Foreword

This analysis represents the product of a collective effort of a group of students majoring in Security Studies at the 'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris'.

The main objective of this report, designed to be a working document, is to help clarify some ideas concerning European security and defence in order to contribute to enrich the current debate around those issues. Our aim is to point out the main limitations to the development of an integrated European Security and Defence Policy for a changing strategic environment.

Regarding methodology, we developed a scientific approach purely based on the study of ideas expressed in interviews with high-rank professionals, reflecting them in a single body. Our research was not guided by any ideological motivation, nor by any anticipated conclusions except one: the necessary diversification of interviews in order to reflect properly the complex notion of security. The militaries, politicians, industrials, researchers...who all are security actors, express indeed common concerns despite their different backgrounds. More precisely, this work is intended to give voice to their operational and professional point of view.

The key question guiding our enterprise was simple after all: What opinion and judgement do they express with regard to European Security and Defence Policy in general, and the debate generated by the European Convention in particular? The variety of professional perspectives recorded, made this undertaking a delightful and very enriching experience.

Within three months we carried out 26 interviews with representatives from the European institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament), national institutions (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of the Interior and Defence Ministry, New Scotland Yard), international organizations (NATO), the industrial sector (EADS) and last but not least the research community (EUISS Paris, IFRI, FRS). Since a large number of interviewees wanted us to keep their statements confidential, we decided to not include the detailed summaries of each interview.

Those involved in the project were:

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We would like to thank all the participants who gave some of their time to sit down for an interview and to cooperate in other ways. We hope that this document can constitute a fruitful feedback for all the readers, professional or not, with an interest in the current debate on security and defence.

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We would like to express our gratitude for fruitful cooperation to those who accepted to contribute anonymously and to:

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Introduction

This document has taken shape at a time when the debate on a future Common European Security and Defence Policy has often left rational grounds. Recent developments around the war in Iraq and subsequent 'collateral damage' within both transatlantic and European institutions have led to worrying cleavages within Europe and in its relation with the United States of America. It goes without saying that this context has been harmful to a sincere and serious debate about European security and defence. In this context of highly passionate debate, the European Convention had the difficult task to elaborate consensual reform proposals in order to render ESDP more coherent and effective.

This general state of mind seems to contrast considerably with the vast majority of our interviewees who displayed above all a great sense of pragmatism, refusing to take part in overall tensions on the policy side. They all were well aware of major obstacles to a reinforced ESDP, but favoured a constructive and positive approach at all time.

As some of them recalled, the issue of European Defence is not new, but has indeed been raised right from the very beginning of the European integration process. Thus, the failure of a European Defence Community in 1954 already displayed that what is needed most above all is strong political determination. Since then, European integration has been moving forward step by step, leading first and foremost towards a deeper political and institutional integration in the economic field.

Regarding security and defence matters, however, reform was timid and success rather limited. It is only after the harmful experience in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s that the need for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) really entered the mind of European policy makers. Some years later the Franco-British summit of St. Malô laid the foundation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Today, it is a changing strategic environment and the multiplication of transnational threats that should give new impetus to ESDP. But adapting to new threats and developing a new security approach is not only a matter of policy makers. What is needed is a public

debate about how to define means and ends of European security - going along with the perception of a 'European homeland' and a deepened European citizenship.

Consequently, we deemed it worthwhile to give voice to on-the-field professionals, who are assuring European security and defence by their day to day work and represent at the same time civil society. Their perspectives may sometimes be diverging, yet they represent an essential element for any fruitful debate. Confronting them with the proposals elaborated by the working groups VIII (Defence) and X (Freedom, Security and Justice) of the European Convention is just one way of increasing synergy. Thus, the report mainly focuses on those security and defence issues that have been brought up by the Convention or directly by our interlocutors.

We would like to briefly remind our reader the main proposals put forward in this respect by the Convention:

ESDP:

- updating the Petersberg tasks (crisis management)
- favouring constructive abstention in decision-making
- strengthening the role of the High Representative
- including a 'solidarity clause' into the treaty
- possibility of closer cooperation between states
- creating a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency

Security and Justice:

- re-inforcing Police cooperation via EUROPOL
- upgrading judicial cooperation via EUROJUST
- creating European borderguards
- creating a structure for operational cooperation within the Council of the EU

The proposals for a more cohesive approach towards European Security and Defence being recalled, it is up to policy makers to listen and to take into account the views and judgements of the 'operational-professional level'.

1. The dissemination of the conclusions of the European Convention among professionals

1. General knowledge about the Convention:

After more than 25 interviews we have been able to measure the degree of knowledge and concern among the defence and security professionals regarding the work of the European convention. The professional background might certainly have an influence on this degree of knowledge

(a) Researchers:

The researchers who were interviewed all had an extended knowledge of the proposals that were debated during the meetings of the European Convention. They were able to place the convention chronologically and considered it an evolutionary process in the European constructions that must be integrated into a long term perspective. More specifically they were above all familiar with the propositions that concerned their particular fields of interests. They had a specific knowledge about the documents issued by the groups VIII and X (defence and security issues).

(b) High ranked Police and military officials

The vast majority of high ranked police and military officials are not extensively familiar with the work of the Convention and its impact on their activities. While they had a general idea about the main proposals of the Convention, they did not feel able to judge by themselves the impact of the work in detail. Some rare exceptions among them were not aware of the fact that the Convention touched upon the issue of security and defence. According to our interviewees the professional sector of the police and military in general is not well acquainted with the conclusions of the Convention. They remained rather critical about the Convention's impact.

(c) NATO, European authorities, national diplomats

(aa) NATO

Aside from high ranked officials directly involved in EU-NATO relations, other high level officials of the International Staff were not familiar in detail with neither the proposals, the processes and the conclusions of the Convention. Most of them had a general transversal knowledge.

(bb) European Union

Members of the Commission, the Parliament and the Council have a more profound knowledge concerning the work of the European Convention. The interviewed were able to name specific proposals as well as to give relevant judgements regarding the initiatives and the coherence of the work.

(cc) National authorities

National diplomats and military attaches dealing with matters of security and defence policy were widely aware of the debate led around the European Convention. However their judgements were partly influenced by their national perspectives.

2. General Assessment of the Convention

It was generally acknowledged that the European Convention identified crucial issues currently at stake for Europe's security, creating a necessary debate about means and ends of a credible European security and defence policy. The assessment of the Convention's work was very different according to the interviewee and his professional background. While some interviewees saw the Convention's work as being very useful, others expressed their concern about the method and the content of the debate.

(a) Positive interpretations of the European Convention

Representatives of EU institutions generally described the results of the Convention as being very encouraging. According to them, the Convention would play a vital role for the future of a Common security and defence policy. A reinforcement of CFSP/ESDP would still be the only possible solution for the type of crises the European Union had to face in Bosnia Herzegovina (1995) and Kosovo (1999). The work of the Convention could have an even greater impact at this very moment, as there would be a certain feeling of frustration among the peoples in ESDP matters since the Iraq crisis. The European Convention would represent a unique opportunity to seize during a short “time window”. If a common political will was not to emerge right now, damage might be important for a long time to come.

Furthermore, many of the interviewees were convinced that the progress made in ESDP is often under-estimated. Concerning the critique, which often underlines the persistent slowness of institutional reform and an excessive ‘institutionalist approach’ in general that would prevail in CFSP matters, some interviewees took the opposite side: On the contrary, considering the actions taken after the summit of St. Malô in 1998, one had to admit that substantial progress has been made to an unthinkable extent some years ago. The creation of the PSC (Political and Security Committee) and of the EU military staff are positive examples. Furthermore, the modification of the judicial framework and institutional reform would be necessary to adapt to new political responsibilities.

Another interviewee who also judged the outcome of the Convention very positively, expressed some doubts about the effective implementation of the Convention’s propositions. However, the Convention would give a first and strong impetus, which should be followed by political decisions at the intergovernmental conference.

(b) Main criticism

Two criticism about the Convention’s work on security and defence matters were predominant throughout our interviews, addressing both form and content of the debate led in the relevant working groups.

Firstly, in comparison with other working groups of the Convention, debate in working group VIII on defence matters had been rather weak, namely due to a limited

interest and ambition of some of its members to deepen the topics and to formulate truly new approaches. Thus, the composition of the group was criticized as several members had not sufficiently been specialized in security and defence matters. However, the debate had gained some impetus and strength in the last months, namely due to ambitious external proposals presented to the working group (as for example the Franco-German proposal of a European Security and Defence Union).

Secondly, the content of the propositions itself was criticized. Instead of favouring a radically new cross-pillar approach, the Convention had addressed the issue in patterns and perspectives that are not appropriate to resolve current problems. It would not be sufficient to concentrate on purely institutional issues in order to make CFSP/ESDP more effective and credible. Thus, the Convention would not be able to provide a powerful statement on the future of a common European defence policy.

High rank military and Police officials stated that the Convention would have been a typical example of the persistent gap between political rhetoric and operational reality. Several professionals, both from military and Police background, expressed doubts about the functional operability of the proposals. Generally, high-ranked professionals had the impression that their point of view had not sufficiently been taken into account by the Convention.

An important number of interviewees from different professional backgrounds was sceptical about the effective implementation of the Convention's proposals. One would have to wait for the intergovernmental conference charged to take the final decision and being the real measure stick in terms of solidity of the political consensus achieved.

II. Scope and Nature of the European Security area in light of enlargement

The idea of a “European Security Area” seems to be a non-defined concept. In fact, three main elements appear while trying to define the geographical scope and the conceptual foundation of this area.

1. Geo-strategic issues

Talking in geo-strategic terms, the EU enlargement to the East has modified several questions. First of all, new borderlines project the EU towards new zones of influence and friction. In those areas, potential conflicts will certainly have de-stabilizing consequences for the security of the European Union, also in view of potential flows of displaced people and refugees.

Regardless of the current lack of legal personality of the EU, (the European Convention plans to confer it to the EU), a strong policy of security agreements with Eastern European countries that are not members of the EU is suitable. It was deemed of particular importance to ‘upgrade’ the cooperation between the EU and Russia as well as with countries of Central Asia in order to create a stable and secure environment. This initiative should cover the European Union from a hypothetical disengagement of the US in Europe towards Central Asia. Similarly, the Mediterranean Dialogue should significantly be increased.

An extended European Security Area is the consequence of the geographic enlargement of the European Union, but does certainly that not end with the borderlines of new members. Potential conflicts in these regions are not exclusively a matter of Foreign Affairs. Terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration and drug trafficking, to name but a few, would equally represent a challenge to the domestic security of the EU.

The distinction between an internal and an external approach to security threats becomes obsolete as well as the separation of the domains of action within the different administrative units (departments) that are dealing with these matters. There is growing interpenetration of foreign policy and internal policy that should led in due time to the construction of a larger concept of European domestic security, perceiving the ‘European Homeland’ as an entity.

The EU has a zone of immediate strategic interest. For some interviewees this area might be conceptualized by the triangle “Arctic-Gulf of Guinea-Persian Gulf”. In fact, the United States’ policy of passing bilateral security agreements with countries in critical security areas (such as Qatar or Dubai) and stationing forces in these areas, could be a referent for an integrated EU security policy.

2. Force Projection

In terms of force projection, it is unavoidable to talk about the Petersberg Tasks that will have to adapt to a new security environment due to new borderlines of the EU. Without any doubt, they will remain a central element of ESDP. Therefore, definition of the Petersberg tasks should remain as large as possible in order to preserve an important degree of flexibility in the implementation of future missions in a new geo-strategic context. Thus, Petersberg tasks had already undergone a change in substance by replacing the notion of ‘peacemaking’ by that of ‘peace enforcement’. It was also emphasized that due to new threats Europe should think about creating a corps of common special forces that could intervene on a global scale in conflicts like the one in Afghanistan.

Moreover, there is need to clarify the final objectives and the resources needed. Future military interventions will need more resources and a clear political support and decision about the intended goal. Increased military integration is desirable, but of little help without strong political cohesion.

Several modifications seem necessary to develop a credible military force. First of all, the increase of resources allocated by the Headline Goal to the Rapid Reaction Force. Secondly the reinforcement of the command structure and of autonomous operational planning capabilities. This should allow the EU to take a leading role in crises of diverse nature such as the Afghanistan crisis or conflicts in Eastern Europe.

The pillar structure do not represent an institutional impediment towards an increased role of the Petersberg Tasks. Since up to now European states are not prepared for a ‘communitization’ of their defence policies, the Petersberg Tasks remain the only realistic approach to treat these security issues.

3. NATO-EU relations

Interviewees underlined the recurrent ambiguity on both sides of the transatlantic link when it comes to implementing defence structures : the EU's ambiguity, claiming for an autonomous defence while using NATO resources and structures including non-EU member's support (specifically Turkey). Ambiguity on the American side, pushing for a less autonomous EU approach while at the same time asking for an increased European contribution and burden-sharing.

In this context several interviewees expressed their satisfaction about the Berlin + agreement that allows for EU-led military operations based on NATO command and control capabilities and structures.

Yet, it was stated that in the long terms the Berlin+ agreement was not sufficient as the EU had to develop a truly autonomous approach. In the immediate future Europe might indeed concentrate on civil tasks and peacekeeping missions while letting the 'high end of spectrum' to US led coalitions. Even high NATO officials argued however that Europe had to develop its own independent force projection capabilities sustainable on a global scale. Yet, before reconsidering in depth EU-NATO relationship, Europeans must both increase military capabilities and develop a coherent European security concept and military doctrine that would define the threat environment and area of intervention. Nato officials argued that Nato might help Europe to increase budgets and strategic thinking on a global scale. Developing a new strategic culture and thinking would be of utmost necessity. EU citizens seem worried about their internal security, covered by their Ministries of Home Affairs, but barely see the need of countering external threats by EU force projection.

NATO and EU should be complementary institutions. Yet, to avoid an ever widening gap in strategic cultures and in order to put the transatlantic link on stable grounds the EU must define its immediate area of influence.

One interviewee stated that a Common European Minister of Foreign Affairs might help to clarify EU-NATO relations. It would be very important that he had a Deputy or adviser responsible for security and defence issues. The creation of a European ministry of defence would be suitable but represents an absolute taboo and is not on the agenda.

III. Diverging strategic cultures

Dual NATO-EU membership leads to an overlapping of strategic cultures: national strategic cultures on the one side, a potential strategic approach of the EU as a whole and a strategic culture within NATO on the other side.

It is important to remember that in accordance with article 5 of the Washington treaty, collective defence falls under NATO's competence. However, it has been stated that the EU should develop its own strategic concept.

1. Towards a strategic concept for the EU?

While for some interviewees a European strategic concept was deemed indispensable in order to allow for a coherent medium and long term strategy and prepare a doctrine for the use of force in times of high intensity crises, others remained sceptical about the effective implementation of such a concept.

Among the four crucial issues regarding ESDP, i.e. institutional aspects, capabilities, political will and a security doctrine, the latter was deemed the least urgent to deal with. Capabilities (faster, better and cheaper) and the political will seem to be the two issues that are more urgent to deal with..

In fact, most of the professionals within NATO or the EU are familiar with the debate on a European security concept, fuelled namely by the work developed by the EU Security Studies Institute in Paris and informal think tanks. However, they underlined the existing gap between the work developed by most scholars and universities, who underline the importance of such a concept, and the feasibility and opportunity to implement such a concept.

Most interviewees stated that such a concept could be interpreted as a product of current transatlantic tensions and not as the result of an increased confidence in ESDP and a solid political consensus about its aims: there is no consensus and agreement about the role and position the EU would have to play on a global scale. Without such an agreement any strategic concept had to remain a rather superficial document that would break up at the real first crisis.

The questions that need an answer prior to the development of such a concept are indeed vague but basic:

- What role do the Europeans want for the EU in the world?
- What kind of international order and transatlantic relationship in the light of an enlarged EU?
- Is the concept of autonomy for ESDP a core element or an accessory one?

A similar document without the political transcendence associated to a strategic concept could be indeed useful and opportune. In any case, it should underline the actual priorities: Crisis prevention and the priority for a multilateral approach to solve them. It could be conceived as a consensus to settle down the differences between more atlantist countries (the UK, Netherlands, Italy and Spain), neutrals (Austria, Ireland and Sweden) and the group of the four (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg).

2. A new security strategy as a substitute of a strategic concept

Developing an all-encompassing strategic concept seems premature because of political imperatives and subsequent lack of effective implementation. Moreover, the term of ‘strategic concept’ is normally associated with a military alliance. Yet, the implementation of a security strategy (strategic doctrine) seems more feasible.

This document could fix the priorities and solve some doubts about the objectives, threats and future interventions. Two elements remain essential:

- The definition of the EU’s zone of interest and influence
- The core idea of a complementary NATO-EU approach

At this point, European universities and think tanks should make circulate proposals in order to create a general favourable state of mind to the implementation of such a security strategy. The document should give some clear and politically supported directives for the military to act and decide central issues. It could namely address and give direction over issues such as preventive war or the intervention of the EU outside its borders.

The inclusion of a new article 5 such as the one of the Washington Treaty (NATO) and Brussels Treaty (WEU) remains problematic because of diverging views among European states.

3. The nuclear

The issue of nuclear power has been left unsaid. Recent developments in doctrine and technology in the US since the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 are not part of the current debate. According to some interlocutors, this issue has to be treated sooner or later. Europe would have to take a clear position on the issue in the medium term. It would imply two fundamental questions:

- The first question touches upon a 'communitarization' of the nuclear forces. Nowadays it is almost impossible to even consider this possibility. This situation can not only be explained by the disinclination of European nuclear powers to share their respective prerogatives but also by the difficulty to set up a unique structure that would bear ultimate responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons.

- The second question concerns the creation of a conventional European defence shield based on the US model. Strategic and technological implications for Europe would have to be considered.

4. Intelligence

New threats are not solely a matter of military response and the EU must guarantee its protection by complementary means. According to all our sources, the domain of intelligence, an issue that was not raised at St.Malô, is crucial when it comes to countering new threats. A reinforced cooperation among Member states and with the allies of the EU, namely the USA, implies a consensus over an equilibrium between Intelligence based on technology and Intelligence based on human resources. While an integration in this field seems to be rather impossible since intelligence services are based above all on national competencies, considerable effort should be developed to strengthen information exchange on a bilateral basis.

IV. Towards an integrated domestic security approach?

In the light of new threats to security that affect the European territory, two working groups of the European Convention have addressed the issue of a common approach aiming at preventing non-classical transnational threats.

Working group VIII in charge of ESDP proposed to add a 'solidarity clause' to the treaty: This clause would be aimed at providing crucial assistance **in case** of a major terrorist attack in one of the EU member states. It would allow for the rapid cross-border mobilization in terms of civil protection, law enforcement and military assistance.

Working group X, dealing with judicial and security issues, has developed some proposals in order to make anti-terrorist policy more effective, namely the reinforcement of Eurojust and Europol in view of a future common European space of justice. Cooperation among Member States should be deepened in both judicial and operational terms.

The main question arising from these proposals is twofold:

- To what extent can Europe achieve a more integrated approach to security and defence of the 'European Homeland'?
- Along which lines should this co-operation be organised?

Some interlocutors see the proposal of a 'solidarity clause' as a mere formalization of an already existing, implicit solidarity among European nations. Yet, beyond this, several interviewees stressed the structural need for

- a thoroughgoing debate about how the new threats do affect Europe in comparison with the United States. It is crucial in this respect that European defence and security cannot be conceived in mere terms of military capability. Europe has to take into account and to rationalize its all-encompassing self-protection as opposed to traditional self-defence. Therefore, it is indispensable that ESDP re-evaluates the role of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The issue of co-operation between police and military across European borders, at the cross-roads of internal and external security, has to be addressed.
- a reorganisation and harmonisation of judicial norms, creating a single space of justice, namely in view of a coherent immigration policy.

Decisive improvement in this sector has been prevented by the lack of political consensus when it comes to a common European homeland security. While there is some consensus about the negative effects of a pillar-structure that makes any effective approach rather impossible, no substantial progress has been achieved as to an effective reorganization of cross-pillar anti-terrorism policy. The only noticeable achievement in this respect can be seen in the development by the European Commission of civil protection policy within the 1st pillar.

Thus, interviewees representing authorities dealing with law enforcement criticized the current organization of EU security policy in three pillars. At the same time, they did not call for an overall federal approach of these elements. It has been stressed that the 'solidarity clause' would not lead to a permanent structure but aims at an ad-hoc co-operation. Any proposal put forward by the political sphere, namely the Convention, towards more 'from the top' integration, is received with great scepticism in the ranks of the professionals of the sector. If they are in favor of an increased exchange, they clearly favour bilateral and 'controlled' multilateral cooperation:

1. Increasing exchange and networking

It is deemed necessary to reinforce the process started with the European summit of Gent, i.e. creating a network of experts in civil protection able to gather national perspectives. Furthermore, in order to enlarge the reach of a coherent civil protection policy, it could be placed under supervision of a troika consisting of the Presidency, the Council and the Commission.

While the creation of a High Representative for Home and Justice Affairs seems premature, the proposal of creating a high-level committee of experts, joining representatives of national law enforcement agencies, has been welcomed. The structure of this 'Committee of internal security' might be build according to the model of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on the ESDP side.

2. Maintaining a bilateral and 'controlled' multilateral approach

In the name of efficiency, interviewees working in the sector of law enforcement, clearly expressed their criticism towards a 'federal approach' in terms of police and intelligence co-operation. Thus it would be far too early to think about a Europol invested with similar powers as the American FBI, let alone of creating truly transnational police forces. The proposal of the Convention to give Europol a new judicial basis and to reinforce its prerogatives has been widely commented by high-level representatives of the law enforcement community (Police, Ministry of the Interior):

As opposed to general public opinion Europol is considered to be a poorly effective and largely bureaucratic organisation when it comes to the fight of terrorism. It is by and large regarded as a purely political initiative and has to face a lot of distrust among professionals in most countries. Europol would thus be a typical example of the conceptual gap between the political and the operational sphere. Therefore, co-operation between Europol and national police forces is rather timid. For most national police and intelligence forces it would be inconceivable to give Europol sensitive information with regard to anti-terrorist operations. Giving these information to Europol would mean taking the risk of not having absolute control about it. Possible leaks could jeopardize an effective anti-terrorist strategy.

However, Europol might play a limited role on issues such as immigration and drug trafficking. It could first and foremost give some impetus for more co-ordination and co-operation among national police forces and urge some countries to contribute and participate more actively.

Therefore, regarding transnational threats, the interviewees stresses the role of bilateral and 'controlled' multilateral co-operation. Multilateral co-operation might be organised either by officially created co-operative structures among a smaller group of countries with regard to a specific threat or along the lines of informal networks. It would be worthwhile to increase the 'European liaison network' which has been created by police officers on an informal basis and to which belong structures such as the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT): This network which consists of an exchange of national police liaisons officers is deemed rather effective because created by the professionals themselves in view of specified needs. The network involves already a large number of countries.

In view of effectively enforcing law it has been proposed by one interviewee to upgrade the project of 'Joint investigation teams' already existing between the Netherlands and Belgium. This concept would allow for police officers to collect evidence in other European countries under the supervision of his foreign counterpart. This model might be a basis for bi- and multilateral operational forces.

The interviewees are unanimous that this form of ad-hoc and informal co-operation is far more effective than any premature federal approach. It is in this sense that the police co-operation has in reality overtaken the theoretical approach proposed by European policy makers.

V. Budget allocation and the issue of an integrated European Research and armament policy

ESDP suffers from a fundamental dilemma: The resources allocated to the defence sector in each of the member states are highly dependent on the different perceptions of the potential role of Europe in world affairs. The credibility and viability of ESDP is handicapped by a great number of mostly decreasing national defence budgets. countries with continuously decreasing defence budgets. The basic consequence is an ever widening transatlantic capability and technology gap.

It was widely acknowledged among interviewees that ESDP will only succeed if all the European countries increase their defence spending and join nations such as Great-Britain or France in making a more serious effort in this regard. However, it has been underlined that rising budgets is not the key to a more effective ESDP alone. Spending more without spending better at the same time would not represent an appropriate remedy.

1. Structural reforms and new forms of resource allocation

- 'Role specialization' among nations as to specific military capabilities: Both large and small countries have to develop specific military capabilities and to concentrate financially on these sectors. Reluctance is to be expected namely from larger countries with an important military tradition as 'role specialization' automatically implies the loss of a certain know-how in other areas. Attention must be paid to the fact that in the long run 'role specialization' and the development of 'niche capabilities' may be taken as an excuse by some countries not to reform their defence apparatus.
- Dual use of resources, i.e. the civilian and military use of cargo aircrafts/lift capabilities: this new form of 'dual use approach' might encounter a potentially reluctant public opinion not used to see civilian assets being recycled for military purposes and vice versa.
- Re-structuring the budget itself in spending 50-60% of available funds for research and procurement and 40% for personal costs. The current proportion of expenditure reflects that expenditure is too heavily oriented along social criteria instead of taking into account objective needs in terms of equipment.

2. An integrated European Research and Armament policy

Nearly all interviewees have stressed the fact that fragmented national research programmes were a considerable drain on effective resource allocation due to extremely high costs in this field. It would therefore be indispensable to create a common research budget and to restructure European Armament industry. In reforming and integrating the national services that are responsible for armament acquisition, considerable financial assets would be freed. Yet, the creation of a single European Armament Acquisition Agency does not have political support and seems premature.

In this context the proposal of the Convention to create a European Armament and Strategic Research Agency that would define and harmonize the needs in terms of acquisition might represent a first step. It has been welcomed and hope has been expressed the process may lead to the restructuring of the European armament policy as well as creating a real single defence market.

The industrial cooperation in the defence sector is judged as being very limited and embryonic so far. OCCAR, LoI (Letter of Intent) and GAEO/OAEO are still intergovernmental bodies and show a persistent lack of autonomy. OCCAR is merely in charge of the management and implementation of armament programmes but has no say when it comes to define and harmonise European needs in terms of military equipment. Thus, political support to more industrial cooperation takes place so far in a statutory framework and not in a general European integrative mechanism..

The proposal of the Convention of a European Armament and Strategic Research Agency is seen as a decisive step forward because the new agency will be a EU agency aimed at dealing also with the upstream procurement cycle that was so far of exclusive national responsibility. The agency should integrate OCCAR for implementation and management. It would be a real test of the solidity of the political will to create a single and competitive defence market. Yet, in order to prevent that this Agency represents just another institutional reform while avoiding structural reform, it would be of utmost necessity to:

- 'europeanize' the supply: One could take the restructuring and consolidation of European aerospace and electronics industry (EADS/THALES) as a model and extend it to land armament and naval systems. The primary aim would be to avoid redundancies and to develop an effective division of labour among countries. Airbus, on the civilian side, would be a good example in this respect. Furthermore, major challenges would be the integration of Eastern European defence industries that are largely in deficit and the rising role of the US on the European market.

- 'europeanize' the demand: It is important to launch common armament programmes based on common technical standards. This would allow for important economies of scale and a consistent reduction of costs while increasing interoperability at the same time.

- harmonize legislation: There is still no single competitive market. The integration of the European armament industry is often limited to share holders and the management level while national production units and the operational level remain mostly compartmentalized. Rationalization and competitive adjustment to the market is hampered by different national labour market legislation.

- concentrate on research: It is crucial to acknowledge the dual use dimension of high level strategic research. The proposed European Armament Agency might give an impetus to tear down conceptual borders between military and civilian research and use of products. While the Agency should be fully responsible for specific project related research, it should work in close co-operation with the Commission as to advanced research (high technology). The 'Agenda for Advanced Research' recently prepared by the Commission should be taken as a starting point to develop a common approach towards advanced research and to integrate national financial resources allocated to this field.

There is consensus that the European Armament industry itself would be able to adapt rapidly to these changes leading in due time to a truly single and competitive European market. European defence industries had performed important mergers within the last years, being in advance of European policy makers. Yet, different national traditions and a protectionist governmental approach in most countries towards defence industries would make free competition and thus effective restructuring impossible. If the defence industry is supposed to contribute effectively to European capabilities it must not be seen

any more as a means of social policy. Current defence industries in Europe are too often supported in view of national labour markets. At the same time, national bureaucracies would be extremely reluctant to give way to structural reforms.

We contend that the modification of the actual trend of expenditure as well as the increase in the defence budget is a priority. However, such a reform needs to be sold to the public opinion assuming a certain political burden due to the unpopularity of such measures. Thus, local candidates (because of their proximity to the electoral body) are the key elements of such a reform. Indeed, they must stress the fact that the reform is absolutely necessary. This debate is not the monopoly of EU high level instances but the task of local politicians to increase the proximity of such debates. Prior to this, a basic core agreement between the directing bodies of national parties would be needed.

3. Interoperability and standardization

Most interviewees stressing the importance of an autonomous European armament policy, have equally addressed the issue of interoperability and standardization. It was deemed vital to increase interoperability and standardization among Europeans and with the United States in the NATO framework. Therefore NATO's standardization agency would indeed play a crucial role as to interoperable armament systems. However, according to some interlocutors, Europeans lack a common strategy in terms of lobbying that would be crucial in the promotion of military norms and in order to back European defence industries to sell their armament systems. It would therefore be suitable for European armament industries to constitute a common strategy of lobbying. In this context, one of the interviewees spoke in favour of a permanent representation of European armament industries in order to take actively part in standardization policy. One interviewee, expects NATO to play an increasing role in this field. Thus, European armament industries had to be represented at NATO's new strategic command for research in Norfolk/USA.

VI. Networking defence: industries – universities - think tanks - policy makers - civil society

The methodology that was used to conduct the interviews gave interviewees the opportunity to share their views on numerous aspects that appeared important to them. Even though the issue of networking defence was not part of the investigation in the first place, most interviewees had a strong opinion on the subject. It therefore seems important to reflect the defence professionals' preoccupations on this matter. The interviewees basically identified two broad orientations.

1. Synergy among the defence actors

One of the major reasons why there is not full understanding of the stakes and goals of the ESDP is the lack of effective links and exchange of information between the universities (of engineering for instance), think tanks (such as the EUISS), the industrial sector and decision makers that relay the information to the public. Indeed, according to the interviewees, the main problem is the slow flow of information and therefore the lengthy processes of decision making within EU institutions. In this perspective, the creation of a kind of common forum, which would improve and direct the information exchange, would be an adequate response.

Moreover, a European Defense College (inspired by the NATO Defense College of Rome and the College of Europe in Bruges) would be highly suitable. It would make converging the various European strategic cultures by integrating different ideas and perceptions into a fruitful debate. It would favour the rise of a common strategic culture and education and thus a coherent EU doctrine in the future. In other words, it would provide 'the cohesion and glue' necessary to implement a common view on defence aspects. Finally, it would provide a core thinking over the EU security issues. This network would allow the exchange of rationalised knowledge and information between defence professionals and scholars. Defence actors could therefore gravitate around a common nucleus and thus rationalise the various needs. Finally, policy makers could refer to the state of the reflection more easily and thus take more coherent actions. Discrepancies between the declarations of intention and the reality regarding the European Security and Defence Policy could be avoided to the advantage of more credibility.

2. Educating the Civil Society over the security issues

The second tendency that seems crucial to address is the risk of rising euro-scepticism which can partly be explained by the blurred picture of the defence issues. As some interviewees stated, public opinion is not aware nor implicated enough in the debate. Therefore, in order to harmonize European public opinions, it is crucial to give the current debate more conceptual and methodological clarity.

This aspect must not be omitted or neglected, because public opinion is the ultimate driving force of any political decision. According to the majority of interviewees, involving Civil Society is the only way by which governments would be able to raise defence budgets as well as to define common objectives. As long as the different national public opinions are not harmonized around a common vision of what the role of the European Union and its security should be, policy makers will not be able to gather and to define common goals.

This also implies the development of a real pedagogy of the new threats. According to the professionals, the public is not sufficiently aware of new threats to their own security. Therefore, this aspect must not be treated as a third class issue, it must be considered a priority. The vast majority of European people remains captured in old patterns of thinking with regard to security and defence. New threats implies new approaches: Traditional armies based on conscription are inefficient to fight trans-national, diffuse, and technological threats. Nowadays, technological devices and human resources must complement each other. This evolution has a financial cost as well as a political cost. Therefore, unless public opinion is fully educated on that subject, it seems barely possible for governments to assume the political costs of urgently required reforms.

VII. Various perceptions over setting priorities

Each interview concluded with the question of the immediate measure to take in view of a more efficient ESDP. It revealed various perceptions on what has to be done first. Four orientations seem to be predominant. The responses do not necessarily reflect the professional categories displayed in chapter one.

1. The issue of lacking political will

Interviewees all agreed on one issue: there is an obvious lack of political will in the implementation of ESDP. They acknowledged that the present situation is highly influenced by the recent events in Iraq and transatlantic tensions. But beyond that, it seems that the European Member States are not prepared to honestly expose their views on the future of ESDP and the role they want Europe to play on a regional or global scale. Under these circumstances, two options seem given in order to arouse political action: a first approach based on European public opinion, a second one based on a nucleus of leading countries.

For a significant part of interviewees, harmonizing the different national public opinions was seen to be the crucial issue. Ultimately, public opinion will constitute the main driving force for ESDP. The debate initiated by the European Convention is therefore of utmost importance in order to make European citizens actively participate. Yet, one can wonder if the debate really addresses and reaches the vast majority of citizens. So far, echo in the media has been rather timid when it comes to ESDP. It is all the more important that national and local policy makers develop a common pedagogy around security and defence issues.

The second option is to create a small avant-garde of leading countries. They should considerably reinforce bottom-up cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral level. It would be particularly worthwhile to integrate national services such as the prevision and planning cell, the proliferation services or the armament directions of respective Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries. This kind of integration would prevent countries to fall back into national rationales.

2. Harmonizing judiciary procedures

High-rank Police and military officers focused on Intelligence and exchange of information issues. According to them, priority must be given to the enhancement of these aspects and legal procedures have therefore to be harmonized.

There would be an urgent need for the harmonization of judiciary procedures (European arrest warrant) and penal law in general. Yet, progress is hampered by different legal systems and deep-rooted national conceptions.

3. Making EU institutions more effective

According to several interviewees, mostly representatives of EU institutions and NATO, there is need of several adjustments on institutional grounds. A closer relation and cooperation between the Council and the Commission for example is suitable. Their actions should be harmonised in order to allow a more coherent approach.

Furthermore, the EU should develop its autonomous operational planning and command capabilities, namely by creating a fully operational European HQ. This would allow for wider missions under EU direction that are not limited to restricted crisis management operations. At the same time joint military exercises with NATO should be reinforced in order to assure a satisfying level of combat force.

4. The capabilities approach

Most of the interviewees, regardless of their professional background, have a so called capability-led approach. A credible ESDP would rest on up-to-date equipment and a highly competitive and efficient armament. It implies both increasing the defense budgets as well as organising more efficiently the allocation of resources dedicated to research, namely in the area of new technologies. In more general terms, society would have to integrate the concept of a knowledge-based society that is about to change the very nature of warfare methods. Hence, there is an urgent need for militaries and civilians to deepen cooperation on technological and research issues.

The autonomy of the EU highly depends on aerospace and satellite programs such as Galileo that allows guiding missiles, vehicles, and radio frequencies. Thus, some of the researchers and national representatives urged for increasing European cooperation in that

matter. Beyond this inter-state cooperation, connections between industries, policy makers and researchers have to be re-organized along defined criteria of efficiency.

Increasing capabilities also implies to define short, medium and long term needs in terms of military equipment. To that end, real and effective military capabilities of each Member State would have to be evaluated by an audit. On the basis of the results produced by this audit, one had to think about how to remedy to deficiencies at lowest costs. 'Dual use' of assets (military and civilian) would represent a first step. Improvement would have to be achieved mainly in crucial sectors for European security such as Intelligence, Control and Command capabilities and strategic transport.

Finally, a deeper integration of the industrial sector and a more coherent armament/defence market policy would constitute another priority.

5. Miscellaneous propositions

- Simplifying ESDP budgeting procedures
- Setting up agreements with non-EU countries in order to render EU force projection easier
- Setting up an Internal Security Committee at EU level that would link professionals and operational together.
- Creating a EU Defence College
- Increase networking

Conclusion

It appears that the solutions to most of the problems raised in this study are ultimately and quite clearly linked to a lack of political determination as to deeper integration in such sensitive matters as security and defence - representing the very core of national sovereignty.

Yet, in order to adapt to an evolving international environment, new tools and clear definitions about long-term objectives are required. Here again, professionals of the security and defence sector play a crucial role. Their pragmatic perspective, influenced by years of 'field work', is able to provide us with new insights:

Thus, integration and a more cohesive approach among European states is clearly needed if Europe wants to be taken seriously in a wide range of Security and Defence issues. At the same time, for some security sectors such as Police cooperation, bilateral cooperation might be favoured. In both cases, however, the way of implementing decisions seems to be a crucial concern. It is at this point that the gap between official representatives of European governments and the professional security sector is most important.

The ideas reflected in this report are just a modest trial to trigger and upgrade the dialogue between these two sides of a same coin. The ultimate aim would be to create an all-encompassing debate about security and defence issues. A broad democratic debate within European civil society would be an indispensable asset towards a constructive dialogue. It is in this sense that European security is inseparable from the protection and development of European democracy and its citizens. This perspective may fall on stony grounds for a certain time to come, but it seems to us being a worthwhile and wise option for the future of Europe.